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REASONABLE CHILDRENl
The seeds, as it were, of moral
discernment are planted in the mind by
him that made us. They grow up in their
proper season, and are at first tender and
delicate

and

easily

warped.

Their

progress depends very much upon their
being

duly

cultivated

and

properly

exercised.
[fhomas

Reid, Essays on the Active

Powers of the Mind, 17882]
Introduction
Aristotle warns us that children are not
ready for lectures in moral philosophy.

They

lack experience and they are more subject to
unruly passions than reason. This suggests that
the title of my paper is an oxymoron.
children be reasonable?

Can

On such questions I

am what children's writer and illustrator William
Steig calls a hopist.

A pessimist would insist

that children cannot be reasonable. An optimist
would say either that children

actually

are

reasonable or that becoming so is readily within
their reach.

A hopist attempts to avoid bei ng

overwhelmed by the empirical evidence either
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way.

Instead, he or she simply clings to the

hope that children can be reasonable and sets
about seeing what can be done to help bring this
possibility into reality. Of course, thinking that
something is so doesn't

make it so; but, as

William James points out, believing you can
maintain your balance walking along the edge of
a cliff is essential to be able to do so.
In any case, what follows are some of
my hopist reflections on the prospects for there
being reasonable children. As a sidenote for the
pessimists, I will simply add that if we are to
have any hope that children will end up as
reasonable adults, we need to attend carefully to
those aspects of childhood that hold out some
prospect for such an outcome. As a sidenote for
the optimists,

I offer

'Reasonableness'
concept.

is

a word
not

an

of caution.
all-or-nothing

There are degrees of reasonableness.

Just as Thomas

Reid mentions the need to

nurture the "seeds of moral discernment,"
same

must

reasonableness"

be

said

of

in children.

the

"seeds

the
of

[Since they are

interconnected, this should come as no surprise.]
I have no interest in trying to convert children
into adults. But I am interested in the extent to
which children, as children, can be reasonable,
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as well as the bearing this might have on their
becoming reasonable adults.
My point of entry in this paper is moral
education.

Reasonableness

applies to much

more than morality, but if I can make some
inroads in the very controversial area of moral
education,

the rest of the task should

somewhat easier.

be

I want to discuss two major

areas of popular concern in the public schools
that

provide

entering

wedges

for

moral

education: civic education and critical thinking.
Public education in our society is sustained by a
political system committed to certain individual
liberties and democratic decision making.3

In

turn, public education is legitimately expected to
help sustain that system by preparing children
for citizenship.
education,

This is the function of civic

which

aims

at helping

acquire the necessary understanding
for effective,

responsible

constitutional democracy.4
values

civic

education

students
and skills

participation

in a

What, then, are the
should

emphasize?

Robert Fullinwider suggests the following:5 the
capacity

to

make

independent,

rational

judgments about civic matters; respect for the
rights of others; and the capacity to discuss and
defend political views that may differ from
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theirs.

However, as Fullinwider amply shows,

the dispositions that civic education encourages
do not, in fact, confine themselves to the civic
arena.

For example, the ability to discuss and

defend political views is not an ability to discuss
and defend only that.

Once encouraged, the

critical thinking skills exhibited

in the civic

arena are likely to show up anywhere. And, just
as these skills are assets in the political arena,
they are assets in other areas of life as wel1.6
The kind of critical thinking encouraged
in civic education is a form of reasonableness.
Such reasonableness
reasonableness
virtue.

is a social virtue.

But

in all of its forms is a social

Criteria

for reasonableness

simply conjured up by an individual.

are not
Insofar as

one is reasonable, one is prepared to reason with
others, even if the object of concern is basically
oneself (e.g., "Am I brave?").
reasoning with others involve?

What does
Minimally, it

can be understood to include those skills and
dispositions

encompassed

by what educators

refer to as critical thinking.?

Robert Ennis

succinctly

thinking'

defines

'critical

as

"reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on
deciding what to believe or do."s

Although

admirably brief, Ennis's definition may be too
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narrow.

Critical thinking can also be used to

make sense of what we read, see, or hear and to
make inferences from premises with which we
may disagree

or about which we have no

particular view. Such critical thinking may lead
one to decide what to believe or do, but it need
not.9
In addition to his definition of 'critical
thinking,' Ennis provides an elaborate taxonomy
of critical thinking skills.

This taxonomy is

much broader than his definition would suggest.
It includes dispositions to seek clear statements
of questions, to be open-minded,

to seek as

much precision as the subject permits, to think
in an orderly manner, and to be sensitive to the
feelings and level of understanding of others. It
also includes abilities such as focusing on the
context

of an argument,

assumptions,

clarifying

detecting

unstated

arguments,

making

inferences from premises, and interacting with
others in a reasonable manner.
It is clear from this list that critical
thinking involves more than the employment of
"higher level" thinking skills, and more than
clever or skillful argumentation.

It requires

sensitivity to the needs, interests, and ideas of
others as well as intellectual skills.

lDDDDDD[5lDDDDDD[

Critical

thinking does include thinking for oneself.

But

it also includes thinking well, that is, exercising
good judgment.

This means having reasons for

one's judgments, or, as Matthew Lipman puts it,
having reliable criteria for one's judgments.lO
The idea of thinking for oneself deserves
more attention than I can give it here.ll
least this much should be said.

But at

Thinking for

oneself is not the same as thinking by oneself.
Humpty-Dumpty

claims that words mean what

he says they mean--nothing

more and nothing

less; and he is, therefore, free to make them
mean whatever

he wishes.

This view

of

language doesn't work. Neither does a HumptyDumpty view of critical thinking.

Humpty-

Dumpty cannot make something become a good
reason by deciding, for himself, that it is a good
reason. What makes something a good reason,
in morality or elsewhere,
perhaps controversial,

is a difficult,

matter.

and

But individual

fiat does not make something a good reason.
Neither

does

consensus

of

the

majority.

Although reasonableness requires a willingness
to have one's

reasons

subjected

to public

scrutiny, reasonable people can disagree with
one another; and the number of people on either
side does not settle the question of who, if
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anyone, has the most reasonable view.

This

much is clear, I think, from any comprehensive
taxonomy of critical thinking skills.
Illustrations
It is often asked whether morality can be
taught.

In higher education this question is

commonly converted to the question of whether
morality can be studied.12

Instead of viewing

students as subjected to passive indoctrination,
our attention

shifts

to students

as actively

striving to develop and refine their abilities to
think through moral concerns. This, at any rate,
seems to have been the consensus view of a
large and diverse group of educators brought
together by the Hastings Center some years ago
to discuss the appropriate

goals of teaching

ethics in higher education.
The Hastings Center group agreed on
five major goals.13
Courses in ethics should:
1. Stimulate the moral imagination of
students.
2. Help students recognize moral issues.
3. Help students

analyze

key moral

concepts and principles.
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4. Elicit

from

students

a sense

of

responsibility.
5. Help students to accept the likelihood
of ambiguity

and disagreement

on

moral matters, while at the same time
attempting to strive for clarity and
agreement insofar as it is reasonably
attainable.
Intended for college age students, this set of
goals presupposes that students are not moral
neophytes.

Students are regarded as a basic

resource in the sense that they are assumed
already capable of moral imagination
needs further stimulation),

(which

already capable of

understanding moral issues (even though they
sometimes need help recognizing their presence),
already possessing moral concepts and principles
(which need more careful analysis),

already

having a sense of responsibility (which can be
further activated by studying ethics), and already
somewhat experienced at attempting to negotiate
unclarities

and

disagreements.

Seriously

pursued, these goals can be expected to enhance
the capacity for reasonableness

in students as

they encounter moral issues surrounding them.
Just

as it is presumed

that college

students have some basic logical sensitivities

][][][][][][][
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and abilities prior to taking their first college
course in logic, it is presumed

that college

students have some basic moral sensitivities and
abilities.

If this could not be presumed, one

might ask, how could one even begin to teach a
course in ethics?

But, it might be thought,

matters are quite different at the pre-college
level, especially
There

such

in the elementary

presumptions

have

schools:
no

place.

Particularly at the elementary school level, moral
education is commonly regarded as a matter of
"instilling" or "implanting" moral values.

This

is why many fear placing moral education on
the public schools' agenda.

Whose values, it

may be asked, are to be implanted?

And what

values will they be?
Although the dangers of indoctrination
are very real, they are not nearly as formidable
as is commonly

thought.

This is because

helping even young children nurture their "seeds
of

moral

discernment"

indoctrination.
underestimate

need

not

involve

To conclude that it does is to
the already considerable

moral

abilities children typically already have by the
time they enter school.

In fact, I will try to

show, the Hastings Center goals are suitable for
elementary

school

students

as well

college

][][][][][][][
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students.

Of course, adjustments for the more

limited understanding and experience of young
children must be made.

But enhancing the

capacity for reasonableness

is as realistic an

objective

for young children

as for college

students.

In fact, insofar as children's capacity

for reasonableness is neglected, we should lower
our expectations for the
college students.14
One effective
moral

imagination

example,

what

thoughts

about

reasonableness

of

way to stimulate

the

is through stories.

For

child

has

being

not

had serious

brave--whether

this

involves putting one's head under water for the
first time, going to the dentist, speaking in front
of an audience,

standing

up to a bully, or

staying home alone for the first time?
Frog
bravery.1s

and Toad
Here

is

also
how

wonder
Arnold

about
Lobel's

"Dragons and Giants" begins.
Frog and Toad were reading a book
together.

"The people in this book are

brave," said Toad.

"They fight dragons

and they are never afraid." "I wonder if
we are brave," said Frog. (42)
How can they tell if they are brave?

Toad

suggests two conditions that must be met. They
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must do the sorts of things brave individuals do.
And they must not be afraid when they do them
(or at any other time).
They discover that telling whether these
two conditions are met is not easy:
Frog and Toad looked into a mirror.
"We look brave," said Frog.

"Yes, but

are we?" asked Toad. (42-3)
So, Frog and Toad set out on an adventuresome
hike. They begin climbing a mountain.

They

come upon a dark cave:
A big snake came out of the cave.
"Hello lunch," said the snake when he
saw Frog and Toad. He opened his wide
mouth.

Frog and Toad jumped away.

Toad was shaking. "I am not afraid!" he
cried. (45)
As if to prove their fearlessness, Frog and Toad
continue climbing. Then they hear a loud noise
and see large stones rolling toward them:
"It's an avalanche!" cried Toad.
and Toad jumped

away.

Frog

Frog was

trembling. "I am not afraid!" he shouted.
(47)
They reach the top of the mountain, only to find
themselves under a shadow cast by a hawk.
They jump under a rock. After the hawk flies

lDDDDDD[lllDDDDDD[

away, Frog and Toad scream out, "We are not
afraid!" At the same time they begin running as
fast as they can back to Toad's house.
arriving safely, Toad says:

II

After

Frog, I am glad to

have a brave friend like you."

Frog replies,

"And I am happy to know a brave person like
you, Toad." (50) Then Toad jumps into bed and
pulls the covers over his head. Frog jumps into
the closet and shuts the door.
concludes:

The story

"They stayed there for a long time,

just feeling very brave together." (51)
What should the reader conclude? Were
Frog and Toad brave?

Remember, Frog and

Toad set down two conditions

for bravery.

First, they had to do the sorts of things brave
individuals do. Climbing the mountain and not
turning back seem to be the right sort of thing,
although running back home and hiding may
raise some doubts about just how brave they
were. The second condition, doing these things
without

being

afraid

(in fact, never

afraid), seems to fare much worse.

being

After all,

Toad shook, Frog trembled, and they both ran
down the mountain as fast as they could and hid
under covers and in the closet.

How can they

say they were not at least a little bit afraid?
And doesn't that spoil their bravery?

][][][][][][][ 12 ][][][][][][][

But, a young reader might say, they did
do some things that they had been afraid to try
before. Didn't that take at least a little bravery?
Still, another young reader might reply, they
shook and trembled and ran home and hid. So,
they must have been afraid. Yes, another reader
replies, but weren't some of the things they did
really dangerous?

"Hello, lunch," said the

snake. Was that just a bluff? Wouldn't even a
brave frog have reason to fear such a snake?
What else could Toad do--stay for lunch? But,
the first reader counters, Toad didn't just run
away--he shook.
We adults might now recall Aristotle's
distinction between bravery and foolhardiness--a
distinction that makes fear an integral part of
bravery.

And Aristotle distinguishes

from cowardice.

bravery

What if Toad had not moved,

we ask? Aristotle might say that he was either
foolhardy (lacking

proper fear) or cowardly

(paralyzed by fear).
Can young
distinctions?

children

appreciate

these

One way to find out is to try some

variations on the Frog and Toad story.

This

invites children to analyze key moral concepts.
Suppose that Frog and Toad are next time
accompanied by some other friends, say Turtle
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and Mouse.16

This time when the snake says

"Hello, lunch," neither

nor Turtle nor Mouse

move.

move because he has

Turtle doesn't

fallen asleep inside his shell while they have
paused in front of the dark cave.

He is

awakened by the snake saying "Hello, lunch."
But he simply thinks they are being invited to
lunch and decides he'd rather extend his nap
instead. Mouse doesn't move because he is too
terrified.

Does it matter how Frog and Toad

behave?

Suppose Toad quickly runs to safety,

but Frog first yanks on Mouse's tail to get him
to move to safety. Was Turtle brave because he
wasn't

afraid of Snake?

Was Mouse brave

because he didn't move? Who was more brave,
Frog or Toad? Do we have to suppose that Frog
wasn't afraid when he stayed to help Mouse?
We usually think that being brave is a
good thing.

Is it?

brave and fearless

Why?

Is it better to be

than brave and fearful?

Arnold Lobel doesn't complicate his story by
directly raising such questions.

Frog and Toad

present themselves in such a way that the young
reader is invited to challenge their claims to be
brave.

But it is only a short step from this to

questioning
characterization

Frog
of

and
bravery

Toad's
as
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early
requiring

fearlessness.

If bravery is, indeed, a desirable

quality, then reflecting on what it means to have
it can be a valuable exercise--one that calls on
the use of reason, and one that may contribute to
one's

reasonableness

behavior.

in

both

attitude

and

I?

"Cookies," another Frog and Toad tale, is
a delightful story about will-power:

"trying hard

not to do something that you really want to do".
(35)

If Frog and Toad give away all their

cookies to the birds, does this show that they
now have the will-power not to eat any more
cookies?

Or do they have to be able to resist

eating cookies while they still have some within
reach? Once again, young readers are invited to
analyze an important moral concept, will-power.
Do Frog and Toad really have lots and lots of
will-power after they give the cookies to the
birds? Is Frog and Toad's strategy reasonable,
even if it doesn't actually exhibit will-power?
Here's another possible strategy. Frog and Toad
could keep on eating cookies until they feel sick
(something Frog offers as a reason for stopping
now).

Then they could resist eating more

cookies even if several were left. Of course it
would no longer be true to say that they really
want to eat more--and they wouldn't have to try
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hard at all not to eat them.

Would this be a

reasonable strategy?
What some might want to say is that
Frog and Toad use a reasonable strategy for
dealing with situations in which they don't have
will-power.

If the temptation

is too great,

remove it. But are there times when it might be
really important to be able to do better than this-that is, to be able to resist cookies even when
they are within reach and you really do want
another one? What if you can't really get rid of
what you want (e.g., they aren't your cookies to
give away to the birds, or every time you try to
get rid of a tempting something

more of it

shows up)? Is it important to have will-power
in situations like that?
The

last

story

in

Frog

and

Toad

Together, "The Dream," is quite interesting from
a developmental

standpoint.

Since Lobel's

stories are in the I CAN READ series, the
primary audience constitutes an age range (4-8)
that

Piaget

and

Kohlberg

would

dominated by egocentric thinking.

say

is

If they are

right, most of the intended audience will fail to
grasp much of what "The Dream" is about.
Toad dreams that, as he becomes more and more
impressed with himself, Frog gets smaller and
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smaller.

"Why do you think Frog get smaller

and smaller?" we might ask a four year old.
Our answer is that this is how Frog seems to
Toad in the dream--and this is because Toad
keeps "puffing himself up" in comparison to
Frog:
"Frog," cried Toad, "can you play the
piano like this?"

"No," said Frog.

It

seemed to Toad that Frog looked even
smaller. (55)
"Frog," cried Toad, "can you do tricks
like this?"
"No," peeped Frog, who looked very,
very small. (57)
"Frog, can you be as wonderful as this?"
said Toad as he danced all over the
stage.

There was no answer.

Toad

looked out into the theater. Frog was so
small that he could not be seen or heard.
(59)
Toad dreams he is spinning in the dark, shouting
"Come back, Frog. I will be lonely." (60)
"I am right here," said Frog.
standing near Toad's bed.

Frog was
"Wake up,

Toad," he said.

"Frog, is that really

you?" said Toad.

"Of course it is me,"

said Frog. "And are you your own right
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size?" asked Toad.

"Yes, I think so,"

said Frog. Toad looked at the sunshine
coming through the window.

"Frog," he

said, "I am so glad that you came over."
"I always do," said Frog.
Toad seems to have learned much from this
dream. Can a four-year-old?

Seemingly, no, if

the estimation of developmental

psychologists

such as Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg are
right--for Toad has learned something

about

immodesty, loneliness, and friendship that he
could not appreciate if he were trapped totally
within an egocentric perspective.18

But Toad

can appreciate this, and I'll bet many of his
four-year-old friends can, too.
Sometimes a short passage from a story
can help one recognize a moral issue that had
only moments before gone unnoticed.

J.D.

Salinger's short story, "Down at the Dinghy," is
a case in point.19 Four-year-old Lionel is upset
and threatening to run away:
"Well, will you tell me from there why
you're running away?" Boo Boo asked.
"After you promised me you were all
through?"
A pair of underwater goggles lay
on the deck of the dinghy,near the stern
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seat.

For answer, Lionel secured the

headstrap of the goggles between the big
and the second toes of his right foot,
and, with a deft, brief leg action, flipped
the goggles overboard.

They sank at

once.
"That's
constructive,

II

nice.

That's

said Boo Boo.

belong to your Uncle Webb.
be so delighted.
cigarette.

II

"Those
Oh, he'll

She dragged on her

"They once belonged to your

Uncle Seymour.

II

"I don't care."
"I see that you don't," Boo Boo
said.
Boo Boo then takes a small package from her
pocket.

"This is a key chain," she says, "Just

like Daddy's.

But with a lot more keys on it

than Daddy's has. This one has ten keys."
Lionel leaned forward in his seat,
letting go the tiller.

He held out his

hands in catching position.

"Throw it?"

he asked. "Please?"
"Let'S keep our seats a minute,
Sunshine. I have a little thinking
to do.

I should throw this key

chain in the lake."
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Lionel stared up at her with his
mouth open. He closed his mouth. "It's
mine," he said on a diminishing note of
justice.
Boo Boo, looking down at him,
shrugged.

"I don't care."

Lionel slowly sat back in his seat,
watching his mother, and reached behind
him for the tiller.
pure perception,

His eyes reflected
as his mother

had

known they would.
"Here."

Boo Boo tossed the

package down to him. It landed squarely
on his lap.
He looked at it in his lap, picked
it off, looked at it in his hand, and
flicked it--sidearm--into

the lake.

He

then immediately looked up at Boo Boo,
his eyes filled not with defiance but
tears.

In another instant his mouth was

distorted into a horizontal figure-8, and
he was crying mightily.
Salinger's

little episode cries out for

analysis. Just what is Lionel's perception?

Is it

that one bad tum deselVes another--and best of
all is for the wrong-doer

to administer self-

lDDDDDD[20lDDDDDD[

punishment?

Has Lionel engaged in a bit of

Golden Rule reasoning--or is this a misreading
of the Golden Rule, since it is not clear that
anyone is being done unto as they would have
others

do unto

them?

However

Lionel's

reasoning is to be characterized, it is clear that,
through coming to appreciate a perspective other
than

his

own,

he

responsibility

learned

(eliciting

responsibility)--and

a
a

lesson

in

sense

of

it is clear that this lesson

will not be lost on many young children who
hear a story like this.
Lionel seems to be expressing some sort
of recognition
reciprocity.

of the moral

importance

of

Adults know that this is a very

complex area of moral life. To what extent are
children

capable

complexities?

of

appreciating

such

Lionel seems to have begun to

catch onto some of it at age four.

What is it

reasonable to expect down the road a bit? Some
years ago I had the privilege of participating in
a 40 minute discussion of just such matters with
a group of ten-year-olds.

I began the discussion

by reading an episode from Matthew Lipman's
children's

novel, Lisa.

Timmy accompanies

Harry to a stamp club meeting at which Harry
trades stamps with other children.

][][][][][][][ 21 ][][][][][][][

Timmy is

deliberately tripped by a classmate as he and
Harry

are leaving

the classroom.

Timmy

immediately knocks his classmate's

books off

his desk and runs out of the room.

Later, as

Harry buys Timmy an ice cream cone, Timmy
comments, "But I had to get even. I couldn't let
him get away with it, tripping me like that for
no reason."
Harry and his friends are perplexed by all
these examples.

Is it right to retaliate against

someone who trips you?

How is this like or

unlike a fair exchange of stamps?

If someone

does you a favor, should you return the favor
someday? The lO-year-olds with whom I shared
the story were eager to help sort out these
matters. They discussed at great length possible
alternatives
exercising
challenged

to
moral

Timmy's

retaliation

imagination).

(thus
Larry

the basic idea of "getting even"

(analyzing key moral concepts).
Sometimes

you do need to get even.

Well, actually there's no such thing as
even, because then he'll get even.
Having raised the problem of what it means to
"get even," Larry went on to distinguish between
wanting

to do something

(strike back) and

having to do it.

][] [][][] [] [][ 22 ] [][][]
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Several children suggested ignoring the
offender as a tactic for discouraging him (since
he would have failed to get the desired response
from the victim). Pressed by the example of an
offender who stays on the attack, Carlen said:
If he were to, like Emily said,
chase after you and hit you or something
like that, then you defend yourself.

I

mean, maybe then you've got to get him
back. Not really get him back, but you
have to defend yourself and hit him if
he's hitting you.
So, a basic distinction was made between trying
to get even ("get him back") and self-defense.
Further, the children distinguished both of these
ideas from attempting
lesson.

to teach someone

a

Finally, they carefully distinguished

exchanges

involving

harms from exchanging

favors, insisting that the Golden Rule applies in
the latter cases but not the former.
Although this discussion was limited to
problems that are familiar to children, the tenyear-old participants uncovered an impressive
variety of considerations that need to be brought
to bear on those problems.

I have often asked

myself what other kinds of considerations adults
might wish to bring up in that context. I always
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come up empty. Furthermore, the principles and
concepts discussed by the children serve adults
rather well when applied to analogous problems
in adult life.
The Hastings Center group of educators
emphasize

a fifth goal of ethics in higher

education:

Helping students learn to accept

ambiguity

and disagreement

same time continuing

while at the

to try to reduce it

through further attempts to clarify ideas and
to engage in reasonable discussion.
Here

is a story

that

importance of this fifth goal.
materials

prepared

illustrates

the

It is taken from

by the Institute

for the

Advancement of Philosophy for Children:20
A

teacher

comes

into

her

classroom one day with a large bag of
candy. She explains that the candy is a
gift to the class, and she's been told that
she must distribute it fairly.
Now, she says, "What is fair?
Would the fairest thing be for me to give
the most to those who deserve the most?
Who deserves the most? Surely it must
be the biggest and strongest ones in the
class who deserve the most, for they
probably do most things best."
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But the teacher is greeted by a
large outcry from the class.

"What you

propose is most unfair," they tell her.
"Just because

this

one is better

at

arithmetic or that one at baseball, or still
another at dancing, you still shouldn't
treat us all differently.

It wouldn't be

fair to give some members of the class,
say, five pieces of candy where others
might get one piece or none at all. Each
of us is a person, and in this respect
we're all equal.

So, treat us as equals

and give us each the same amount of
candy."
"Ab," the teacher answered, "I'm
glad you've explained to me how you
feel about this. So, although people are
very different from each other in many
respects,

fairness

consists

of treating

them all equally."
"That's right," the pupils answer.
"Fairness is equal treatment!"
But before

the teacher

has a

chance to distribute the candy, the phone
rings, and she's
office.

When

called down to the
she gets back some

minutes later, she finds that the children
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have all been fighting over the candy.
Now each of the biggest and strongest
children have a big handful of candy,
while

the

remainder

have

varying

amounts, and the smallest children have
only one each.
The teacher demands order, and
the class becomes very quiet. Obviously
she is very disturbed
children

have just done.

determined
they've

about what the
But she's

to be fair, and fairness,

all agreed, is equal treatment.

So, she tells the children, "You've taught
me what fairness is. Each of you must
give back one piece of candy."
As might be expected, most children who hear

this story immediately object that this is not fair.
Adults might think that what ten-year-olds are
likely to do is dwell on various ways of more
fairly handling the distribution

of the candy.

And they would be correct in thinking this.
this is not all that ten-year-olds

However,

discuss--at least not the group to whom I read
this story. 21
Adults realize that this story is about
more than the fair distribution of candy.
about fairness generally--and

It is

especially about
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the ideas of desert and treating people equally.
But ten-year-olds realize this, too. In the space
of fifteen minutes the group with whom I met
discussed the fair grading:

Should those who

are less able get higher grades because they try
harder?

Should grades be awarded for group

accomplishments

rather

individual

(e.g.,

basis

than
90%

just
of

on
the

an
class

performing at a certain level)? They discussed
the importance of having special opportunities
for students with disabilities to receive awards,
as in the Special Olympics.

At the same time,

many insisted that the most able should have
special opportunities, as well.

They discussed

group

alternative

punishment

as

an

to

individually differentiated punishment (both of
which they had undoubtedly experienced).

In

short, in just a few moments, they displayed an
understanding of different, and often competing,
bases for awards

and punishments.

While

appreciating the importance of equality, they
realized that this is complicated by differences
in opportunities,

experiences, abilities, efforts,

and actual accomplishments.
simplistic
satisfaction

solutions
from

and

They shunned
seemed

articulating

to

gain

complicating

factors. They wanted to leave nothing out that
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might affect

a reasonable

determination

of

fairness.
Admittedly,
fairness

or

they did not discuss the

unfairness

of various

taxation

schemes (e.g., flat vs. a graduated rates). Such
concerns will come in due time.

[Actually,

IAPe uses this same story with its high school
materials
taxation.22]

as

a

stimulus

for

discussing

Meanwhile, ten-year-olds (as well

as younger children) have a wealth of examples
that they can usefully

discuss--not

only to

prepare them for difficult issues they will have
to face later, but also to help them cope with
difficult issues they face now.
Conclusion
Any subject (e.g., history, government,
biology, literature) that seriously encourages the
critical thinking of students is an open invitation
for moral reflection.

For those who welcome

the schools helping children become reasonable
persons, this is not unwelcome news. However,
many fear what the schools might do if they
make moral education part of their business, and
they may wish to draw the line at this point.
Nevertheless, deliberately or not, moral
values are reinforced (or undermined)
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in the

schools.

Cheating is discouraged, respect for

students and teachers is encouraged, and so on.
In short, educational institutions depend for their
viability

on the acceptance

values, values that mayor

of basic moral

may not match up

well with values found in the corridors, the
playgrounds, and the streets between home and
school--or even in the homes of some children.
To expect all of this to work out well without
moral education
placed

being in any explicit way

on the educational

agenda

is quite

optimistic.
It might be replied that these moral
values are reinforced only to enable schools to
get on with their

main business--educating

students. These are ground rules for the schools
to function
however,
values

effectively.

Distinct

is the question
should

be

from this,

of whether

discussed

within

moral
the

curriculum itself. But, attempting to keep moral
content

out

hopeless.

of

the

curriculum

is equally

As Fullinwider says, a school that

attempted this would probably have to close
down:23
It could not teach children their native
language since so much of any natural
language is about how to be and not to
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be. It would have to deprive its students
of all stories of human affairs, since
those stories are structured by evaluative
concepts--by ideas of success and failure,
foresight and blindness, heedfulness and
heedlessness, care and negligence, duty
and dereliction, pride and shame, hope
and

despair,

wonder

and

dullness,

competition and cooperation, beginning
and ending.
human

But without

affairs,

effectively

stories of

a school

teach

could

non-moral

not

lessons

either. It could not teach about inflation,
log-rolling,

scientific

coalition-building,
niches,

discovery,

paranoia,

deterrence

of

ecological

crime,

price

controls, or infectious disease.
Worse,

anything

resembling

critical

thinking would need to be eliminated from the
schools, too.

Thomas

Reid notes that our

"power of reasoning, which all acknowledge to
be one of the most eminent natural faculties of
man,...

appears

not

in

infancy."24

capacity, like that of moral discernment,
needs

to be duly

exercised.

cultivated

This
also

and properly

The recen't hue and cry that the

schools are failing to help students develop
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critical thinking skills echoes Reid's observation.
So, there is a nation-wide call for getting beyond
rote learning.

Hardly anyone would oppose

critical thinking in the schools--as long as it can
stay away from the moral domain. But it cannot
be kept away.
An anecdote will illustrate the problem.
A few years ago I visited a 4th grade class.

I

spent the half hour discussing assumptions with
the students. I gave them several "brainteasers"
that can be solved

only

if' one examines

unwarranted assumptions that block our ability
to proceed.

For example, 6 toothpicks can be

placed end-to-end to form 4 equilateral triangles
only

if

we

construct

a

three-dimensional

pyramid, rather than lay them all on a flat
surface.25

As long as we assume we are

restricted to a two-dimensional,

flat surface, we

will not be able to solve the problem.
After class, one of the students told me
a story.

A father and son are injured in a car

accident. They are rushed to separate rooms for
surgery.

The

doctor

attending

the

son

announces, "I cannot perform surgery on this
boy.

He is my son."

The student then asked

me to explain how the boy could be the doctor's
son. I had heard the story several years earlier.

][][][][][][][ 31 ][][][][][][][

So I quickly answered the question.
today's

4th graders

still struggle

Some of
with this

question for a while ("The first father was a
priest," "The doctor was his step-father").

But

when this was first aired on television's "All in
the Family," Archie Bunker was not the only
one who was stumped. A significant percentage
of adult viewers were, too.
Why did this 4th grader come up with
this example?

We had been talking about

assumptions, but none of my examples had any
social content. Here was an example resting on
an unwarranted assumption--an assumption that
contains

gender

stereotypes.

The

student

apparently understood very well the basic point
about assumptions.

Then, like any good critical

thinker, she applied it in a novel way--a way
that has everything to do with moral education.
So, even critical

thinking

about

seemingly

innocuous "brainteasers" threatens to get out of
control.
Given this, it seems best simply to face
up to the task of moral education, rather than act
as if it could be avoided altogether.
something

interesting

happens

However,

when

moral

education is put on the main agenda, rather than
remaining on the hidden agenda.
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If schools

explicitly acknowledge
education

business,

they are in the moral
how

will

they

defend

themselves against the charge of indoctrination?
Fullinwider

suggests

education

as

vocabulary,

that

we

something

like

see

moral

learning

a

learning how to use words and

concepts.

As Fullinwider

puts it, "A moral

education

supplies

of

tools

evaluation

(a

vocabulary) rather than a doctrine for adhesion
(dogma)."26

To

this we should

add that

students need to be encouraged to use these
tools in the classroom.

That is, they need to be

encouraged to engage in evaluative thought-with each other.
When

this

is

done

supportive

atmosphere,

community

of inquiry.27

what

in

a mutually

evolves

is a

In such a classroom

each student is regarded as having the potential
to make valuable contributions

to the issues

discussed. Students are expected to give reasons
in support of what they say, to listen to one
another carefully, and to be responsive to one
another. This kind of learning environment can
be expected to help develop and refine the
reasonableness of students.

Such a community

of inquiry, Reid might agree, affords students
opportunities

to "duly cultivate and properly
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exercise" their
their "seeds
"seeds of
of moral discernment."
discernment."
exercise"
what empowers
empowers students
students eventuaHy
eventually
And this is what
responsibly, on their
their own, rather
rather than
than
to go on responsibly,
under the watchful
watchful eye of
of teacher
teacher or parent.
parent.
under
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Notes
1. Some portions of this paper are drawn from
my "Moral Education: From Aristotle to Harry
Stottlemeier," in Ann Margaret Sharp and
Ronald Reed, Studies in Philosophy for Children
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992),
pp. 15-31; "Families, Schools, and Moral
Education," University of Denver Law Review,
Vol. 69, No.3,
1992, pp. 687-704; and
Philosophical
Adventures
With
Children
(Lanham, Md.: University Press of America,
1985).
2. Thomas Reid, Philosophical Works: Essays
on the Active Powers of the Mind, vol. 2, with
notes by Sir William Hamilton (Hildesheim:
Gekorg Olms Verlagsbuchhandling,
1985), a
reprinting of the original 1788 publication.
3. The civic education argument that follows is
based on Robert Fullinwider's "Science and
Technology Education as Civic Education," in
Paul Durbin, ed., Europe, America, and
Technology:
Philosophical
Perspectives
(Netherlands:
Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1991), pp. 197-215.
4. For a detailed discussion of where CIVIC
education might best fit in the curriculum, see
Alita
Zurav
Letwin,
"Promoting
Civic
Understanding
and Civic Skills Through
Conceptually Based Curricula," pp. 197-211, in
Benninga, cited above.
Clearly, classes in
government, history, and the social sciences are
natural homes for civic education. But there are
other places as well, such as literature and the
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languages.
Letwin discusses educational
materials developed by the Center for Civic
Education, a California nonprofit corporation
that develops programs for both private and
public schools.
Another good discussion of
civic education is Carolyn Perieira's, "Educating
for Citizenship in the Early Grades," pp. 212226.
She discusses the elementary school
curriculum Educating for Citizenship, fieldtested in more than 50 urban and rural Maryland
schools.
5. Fullinwider cites Amy Gutmann, Democratic
Education (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1987); Brian Crittenden, Parents, the State
and the Right to Educate (Melbourne: University
of Melbourne Press, 1988); and William
Galston, "Civic Education in the Liberal State,"
in Nancy L. Rosenblum, ed., Liberalism and the
Moral Life (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1989).
6. How else are we to understand the nationwide call for greater emphasis on developing
critical thinking skills? This is not simply a call
for critical thinking in civic education.
7. The next several paragraphs are taken from
my "Moral Education, Families, and the
Schools," Denver Law Review, 1992.
8. Robert Ennis, "A Conception of Critical
Thinking--With Some Curriculum Suggestions,"
in Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy, American
Philosophical Association, Summer 1987, p. 1.
Ennis and Stephen P. Norris offer the same
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definition in their Evaluating Critical Thinking
(Pacific Grove, CA: Midwest Publications,
1989), p. 3.
There they claim that their
definition is a close approximation of what
educators generally mean by critical thinking.
9. This paragraph and the next are based on my
"STS, Critical Thinking, and Philosophy for
Children," in Paul T. Durbin, ed., Europe,
America,
and Technology:
Philosophical
Perspectives (Netherlands: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1991), pp. 217-246. There I discuss
critical thinking at much greater length. See,
especially, pp. 220-228.
10.
See Matthew Lipman, Thinking in
Education (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1991), Chs. 6 and 7.
11.
For an especially helpful discussion,
particularly in regard to the social aspects of
thinking for oneself, see Philip Guin, "Thinking
for Oneself," in Ann Margaret Sharp and Ronald
Reed, eds., Studies in Philosophy for Children
(Temple University Press: Philadelphia, 1992),
pp.79-86.
12. For example, see Daniel Callahan, "Goals in
the Teaching of Ethics," in Ethics Teaching in
Higher Education, ed. Daniel Callahan and
Sissela Bok (New York: Plenum, 1980), pp. 6174. There the emphasis clearly is on students as
active learners rather than passive recipients of
moral instruction.
13. Ibid.
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14. This worry is precisely what prompted
Matthew Lipman to undertake the project of
presenting logic to elementary school students.
The resulting success of Philosophy for Children
no doubt exceeded his initial expectations, but it
confirms his insight that logic cannot wait.
15. Arnold Lobel, Frog and Toad Together, An
I CAN READ Book (Harper & Row: New York,
1971). Page references are listed in parenthesis
in the text. I am indebted to Gareth Matthews
for first suggesting to me the philosophical
importance of Frog and Toad stories.
16. Lobel's Frog and Toad are both male. My
Turtle and Mouse are also male. It might be
interesting to tell these stories with a mix of
male and female characters, or with only female
characters.
17. Frog and Toad think of bravery in terms of
physical courage--facing
physical dangers.
However, there are other forms of bravery, too-such as moral courage. For example, in Judy
Varga's The Dragon Who Liked to Spit Fire
(William Morrow & Co.: New York, 1961),
Darius the friendly dragon is banished from the
King's castle after accidently setting fire to the
royal banners. Although forbidden from ever
seeing little Prince Frederic again, Darius later
saves Frederic from a wild boar. This might be
regarded by readers as another instance of
physical bravery (depending on whether the wild
boar is seen as posing danger to Darius, too).
But, since Darius was acting contrary to the
king's orders, it seems also to be an instance of
][] [][][][] [][ 38 ][][] [][][] [][

moral courage. An even clearer instance of
moral courage is supplied by the king, who now
has to summon up the courage to admit he was
mistaken:
The king cleared his throat three times.
He did not know how to begin, for kings
don't like to admit they are wrong. But
he was a very just king, so he cleared his
throat a fourth time. "It is rather nice to
have a dragon around the castle," he
said.
"Frederic could never have a
better, more faithful friend than Darius."
He took off his own medal and hung it
on the little dragon's neck.
I wish to thank Diane Worden for bringing Judy
Varga's
story to my attention--and
for
suggesting that it is a story about bravery,
physical and moral.
18. Piaget and Kohlberg claim that children do
not get beyond predominantly
egocentric
thinking until well into their school years.
19. This example was brought to my attention
·by Ann Diller, "On a Conception of Moral
Teaching," in Matthew Lipman, Ann Margaret
Sharp, and Frederick Oscanyan, eds., Growing
Up With Philosophy (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1978), pp. 326-338. Diller's
discussion of this passage is very illuminating.
20. See p. 63 of Philosophical Inquiry, the
teacher's
manual for Harry Stottlemeier's
Discovery. IAPC is located at Montclair State
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College, Upper Montclair, New Jersey. IAPC's
K-12 materials can be obtained by writing to
JAPe.

21. The comments that follow are based on Ch.
V, "Fairness," in my Philosophical Adventures
With Children (University Press of America:
Lanham MD, 1985).
22.
See the workbook for Mark, which
concentrates on issues in civic education and
political philosophy.
23. Fullinwider, pp. 206-7.
24. Reid, p. 595.
25. The pyramid will have an equilateral
triangle as its base, with each side of the triangle
being a toothpick. Each of the remaining three
toothpicks can then have one of its ends placed
at one of the angles of the base triangle, while
the other ends are brought together at a single
point. The result is a four-sided pyramid.
26. Fullinwider, p. 207.
27. For a thorough discussion of the idea of
community of inquiry, see Ann Margaret Sharp,
"What is a Community of Inquiry?" Journal of
Moral Education, 16, no. 1, (January 1987).
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